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-rw-r--r--doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog5
-rw-r--r--src/src/auths/cram_md5.c12
-rw-r--r--src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c18
-rw-r--r--src/src/auths/get_data.c10
-rw-r--r--src/src/auths/heimdal_gssapi.c4
-rw-r--r--src/src/base64.c4
-rw-r--r--src/src/expand.c2
-rw-r--r--src/src/functions.h2
-rw-r--r--src/src/lss.c4
-rw-r--r--src/src/pdkim/pdkim.c2
-rw-r--r--src/src/pdkim/signing.c2
-rw-r--r--src/src/rfc2047.c2
12 files changed, 38 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
index f2802d2fb..b1b79c240 100644
--- a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
@@ -185,6 +185,11 @@ JH/37 Bug 3016: Avoid sending DSN when message was accepted under fakereject
or fakedefer. Previously the sender could discover that the message
had in fact been accepted.
+JH/38 Taint-track intermediate values from the peer in multi-stage authentation
+ sequences. Previously the input was not noted as being tainted; notably
+ this resulted in behaviour of LOGIN vs. PLAIN being inconsistent under
+ bad coding of authenticators.
+
Exim version 4.96
-----------------
diff --git a/src/src/auths/cram_md5.c b/src/src/auths/cram_md5.c
index 280b5293a..583080211 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/cram_md5.c
+++ b/src/src/auths/cram_md5.c
@@ -163,13 +163,13 @@ md5_end(&base, md5secret, 16, digestptr);
/* For interface, see auths/README */
int
-auth_cram_md5_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *data)
+auth_cram_md5_server(auth_instance * ablock, uschar * data)
{
-auth_cram_md5_options_block *ob =
+auth_cram_md5_options_block * ob =
(auth_cram_md5_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
-uschar *challenge = string_sprintf("<%d.%ld@%s>", getpid(),
+uschar * challenge = string_sprintf("<%d.%ld@%s>", getpid(),
(long int) time(NULL), primary_hostname);
-uschar *clear, *secret;
+uschar * clear, * secret;
uschar digest[16];
int i, rc, len;
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ if (*data) return UNEXPECTED;
/* Send the challenge, read the return */
if ((rc = auth_get_data(&data, challenge, Ustrlen(challenge))) != OK) return rc;
-if ((len = b64decode(data, &clear)) < 0) return BAD64;
+if ((len = b64decode(data, &clear, GET_TAINTED)) < 0) return BAD64;
/* The return consists of a user name, space-separated from the CRAM-MD5
digest, expressed in hex. Extract the user name and put it in $auth1 and $1.
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ if (smtp_write_command(sx, SCMD_FLUSH, "AUTH %s\r\n", ablock->public_name) < 0)
if (!smtp_read_response(sx, buffer, buffsize, '3', timeout))
return FAIL;
-if (b64decode(buffer + 4, &challenge) < 0)
+if (b64decode(buffer + 4, &challenge, buffer + 4) < 0)
{
string_format(buffer, buffsize, "bad base 64 string in challenge: %s",
big_buffer + 4);
diff --git a/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c b/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c
index b5d2d1d3b..a3d3906b8 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c
+++ b/src/src/auths/cyrus_sasl.c
@@ -204,16 +204,16 @@ sasl_done();
within a shortlived child */
int
-auth_cyrus_sasl_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *data)
+auth_cyrus_sasl_server(auth_instance * ablock, uschar * data)
{
-auth_cyrus_sasl_options_block *ob =
+auth_cyrus_sasl_options_block * ob =
(auth_cyrus_sasl_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
-uschar *output, *out2, *input, *clear, *hname;
-uschar *debug = NULL; /* Stops compiler complaining */
+uschar * output, * out2, * input, * clear, * hname;
+uschar * debug = NULL; /* Stops compiler complaining */
sasl_callback_t cbs[] = {{SASL_CB_LIST_END, NULL, NULL}};
-sasl_conn_t *conn;
+sasl_conn_t * conn;
char * realm_expanded = NULL;
-int rc, firsttime = 1, clen, *negotiated_ssf_ptr = NULL, negotiated_ssf;
+int rc, firsttime = 1, clen, * negotiated_ssf_ptr = NULL, negotiated_ssf;
unsigned int inlen, outlen;
input = data;
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ if (!hname || !realm_expanded && ob->server_realm)
if (inlen)
{
- if ((clen = b64decode(input, &clear)) < 0)
+ if ((clen = b64decode(input, &clear, input)) < 0)
return BAD64;
input = clear;
inlen = clen;
@@ -345,10 +345,10 @@ for (rc = SASL_CONTINUE; rc == SASL_CONTINUE; )
}
inlen = Ustrlen(input);
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug = string_copy(input);
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug = string_copy_taint(input, GET_TAINTED);
if (inlen)
{
- if ((clen = b64decode(input, &clear)) < 0)
+ if ((clen = b64decode(input, &clear, GET_TAINTED)) < 0)
{
sasl_dispose(&conn);
sasl_done();
diff --git a/src/src/auths/get_data.c b/src/src/auths/get_data.c
index caf4cfdb8..4a35ed064 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/get_data.c
+++ b/src/src/auths/get_data.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ else
uschar * clear, * end;
int len;
- if ((len = b64decode(data, &clear)) < 0) return BAD64;
+ if ((len = b64decode(data, &clear, GET_TAINTED)) < 0) return BAD64;
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("auth input decode:");
for (end = clear + len; clear < end && expand_nmax < EXPAND_MAXN; )
{
@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ Arguments:
Returns: OK on success
BAD64 if response too large for buffer
CANCELLED if response is "*"
+
+NOTE: the data came from the wire so should be tainted - but
+big_buffer is not taint-tracked. EVERY CALLER needs to apply
+tainting.
*/
int
@@ -97,7 +101,7 @@ uschar * resp, * clear, * end;
if ((rc = auth_get_data(&resp, challenge, Ustrlen(challenge))) != OK)
return rc;
-if ((len = b64decode(resp, &clear)) < 0)
+if ((len = b64decode(resp, &clear, GET_TAINTED)) < 0)
return BAD64;
end = clear + len;
@@ -228,7 +232,7 @@ if (flags & AUTH_ITEM_LAST)
/* Now that we know we'll continue, we put the received data into $auth<n>,
if possible. First, decode it: buffer+4 skips over the SMTP status code. */
-clear_len = b64decode(buffer+4, &clear);
+clear_len = b64decode(buffer+4, &clear, buffer+4);
/* If decoding failed, the default is to terminate the authentication, and
return FAIL, with the SMTP response still in the buffer. However, if client_
diff --git a/src/src/auths/heimdal_gssapi.c b/src/src/auths/heimdal_gssapi.c
index 7a74d5be5..59884ef58 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/heimdal_gssapi.c
+++ b/src/src/auths/heimdal_gssapi.c
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ while (step < 4)
break;
case 1:
- gbufdesc_in.length = b64decode(from_client, USS &gbufdesc_in.value);
+ gbufdesc_in.length = b64decode(from_client, USS &gbufdesc_in.value, GET_TAINTED);
if (gclient)
{
maj_stat = gss_release_name(&min_stat, &gclient);
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ while (step < 4)
break;
case 3:
- gbufdesc_in.length = b64decode(from_client, USS &gbufdesc_in.value);
+ gbufdesc_in.length = b64decode(from_client, USS &gbufdesc_in.value, GET_TAINTED);
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat,
gcontext,
&gbufdesc_in, /* data from client */
diff --git a/src/src/base64.c b/src/src/base64.c
index e9ac41a55..591ea3d5b 100644
--- a/src/src/base64.c
+++ b/src/src/base64.c
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static uschar dec64table[] = {
};
int
-b64decode(const uschar *code, uschar **ptr)
+b64decode(const uschar * code, uschar ** ptr, const void * proto_mem)
{
int x, y;
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ uschar *result;
{
int l = Ustrlen(code);
- *ptr = result = store_get(1 + l/4 * 3 + l%4, code);
+ *ptr = result = store_get(1 + l/4 * 3 + l%4, proto_mem);
}
/* Each cycle of the loop handles a quantum of 4 input bytes. For the last
diff --git a/src/src/expand.c b/src/src/expand.c
index 590b40383..b4a76b3e7 100644
--- a/src/src/expand.c
+++ b/src/src/expand.c
@@ -8135,7 +8135,7 @@ NOT_ITEM: ;
case EOP_BASE64D:
{
uschar * s;
- int len = b64decode(sub, &s);
+ int len = b64decode(sub, &s, sub);
if (len < 0)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("string \"%s\" is not "
diff --git a/src/src/functions.h b/src/src/functions.h
index 5db9bc610..4222c623a 100644
--- a/src/src/functions.h
+++ b/src/src/functions.h
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ extern gstring *authres_spf(gstring *);
extern uschar *b64encode(const uschar *, int);
extern uschar *b64encode_taint(const uschar *, int, const void *);
-extern int b64decode(const uschar *, uschar **);
+extern int b64decode(const uschar *, uschar **, const void *);
extern int bdat_getc(unsigned);
extern uschar *bdat_getbuf(unsigned *);
extern BOOL bdat_hasc(void);
diff --git a/src/src/lss.c b/src/src/lss.c
index e6ec1d6d1..55df5775e 100644
--- a/src/src/lss.c
+++ b/src/src/lss.c
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ A zero is added on to the end to make it easy in cases where the result is to
be interpreted as text. This is not included in the count. */
int
-lss_b64decode(uschar *code, uschar **ptr)
+lss_b64decode(uschar * code, uschar ** ptr)
{
-return b64decode(code, ptr);
+return b64decode(code, ptr, code);
}
diff --git a/src/src/pdkim/pdkim.c b/src/src/pdkim/pdkim.c
index c8f180a58..30cb0437c 100644
--- a/src/src/pdkim/pdkim.c
+++ b/src/src/pdkim/pdkim.c
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ return n;
void
pdkim_decode_base64(const uschar * str, blob * b)
{
-int dlen = b64decode(str, &b->data);
+int dlen = b64decode(str, &b->data, str);
if (dlen < 0) b->data = NULL;
b->len = dlen;
}
diff --git a/src/src/pdkim/signing.c b/src/src/pdkim/signing.c
index 07737ab41..35ca79fc1 100644
--- a/src/src/pdkim/signing.c
+++ b/src/src/pdkim/signing.c
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ if ( !(s1 = Ustrstr(CS privkey_pem, "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"))
*s2 = '\0';
-if ((rc = b64decode(s1, &der.data) < 0))
+if ((rc = b64decode(s1, &der.data, s1) < 0))
return US"Bad PEM-DER b64 decode";
der.len = rc;
diff --git a/src/src/rfc2047.c b/src/src/rfc2047.c
index d5e33b9b1..9d7a6e023 100644
--- a/src/src/rfc2047.c
+++ b/src/src/rfc2047.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ for (;; string = mimeword + 2)
encoding = toupper((*q1ptr)[1]);
**endptr = 0;
if (encoding == 'B')
- dlen = b64decode(*q2ptr+1, dptrptr);
+ dlen = b64decode(*q2ptr+1, dptrptr, *q2ptr+1);
else if (encoding == 'Q')
dlen = rfc2047_qpdecode(*q2ptr+1, dptrptr);
**endptr = '?'; /* restore */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-15 02:22:48 +0000