Build: Enable *GNU (Hurd) Bug 2476

[user/henk/code/exim.git] / doc / doc-docbook / spec.xfpt

diff --git a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
index 19c15c21166b139d835f64f3ebbb09c85b1e6fe6..0e7d7655cafa69561d0af16371eb960b617a01ab 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
+++ b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
@@ -13513,6 +13513,19 @@ the transport.
 .vindex &$tls_out_tlsa_usage$&
 Bitfield of TLSA record types found.  See section &<<SECDANE>>&.
 
 .vindex &$tls_out_tlsa_usage$&
 Bitfield of TLSA record types found.  See section &<<SECDANE>>&.
 

+.new
+.vitem &$tls_in_ver$&
+.vindex "&$tls_in_ver$&"
+When a message is received from a remote host over an encrypted SMTP connection
+this variable is set to the protocol version, eg &'TLS1.2'&.
+
+.vitem &$tls_out_ver$&
+.vindex "&$tls_out_ver$&"
+When a message is being delivered to a remote host over an encrypted SMTP connection
+this variable is set to the protocol version.
+.wen
+
+

 .vitem &$tod_bsdinbox$&
 .vindex "&$tod_bsdinbox$&"
 The time of day and the date, in the format required for BSD-style mailbox
 .vitem &$tod_bsdinbox$&
 .vindex "&$tod_bsdinbox$&"
 The time of day and the date, in the format required for BSD-style mailbox


@@ -16750,6 +16763,7 @@ received_header_text = Received: \
         ${if def:sender_helo_name {(helo=$sender_helo_name)\n\t}}}}\
   by $primary_hostname \
   ${if def:received_protocol {with $received_protocol }}\
         ${if def:sender_helo_name {(helo=$sender_helo_name)\n\t}}}}\
   by $primary_hostname \
   ${if def:received_protocol {with $received_protocol }}\

+  ${if def:tls_ver           { ($tls_ver)}}\

   ${if def:tls_in_cipher_std { tls $tls_in_cipher_std\n\t}}\
   (Exim $version_number)\n\t\
   ${if def:sender_address \
   ${if def:tls_in_cipher_std { tls $tls_in_cipher_std\n\t}}\
   (Exim $version_number)\n\t\
   ${if def:sender_address \


@@ -27446,9 +27460,11 @@ This should have meant that certificate identity and verification becomes a
 non-issue, as a man-in-the-middle attack will cause the correct client and
 server to see different identifiers and authentication will fail.
 
 non-issue, as a man-in-the-middle attack will cause the correct client and
 server to see different identifiers and authentication will fail.
 

-This is currently only supported when using the GnuTLS library.  This is
+.new
+This is

 only usable by mechanisms which support "channel binding"; at time of
 writing, that's the SCRAM family.
 only usable by mechanisms which support "channel binding"; at time of
 writing, that's the SCRAM family.

+.wen

 
 This defaults off to ensure smooth upgrade across Exim releases, in case
 this option causes some clients to start failing.  Some future release
 
 This defaults off to ensure smooth upgrade across Exim releases, in case
 this option causes some clients to start failing.  Some future release