.subsection whoson
.cindex "whoson lookup type"
.cindex "lookup" "whoson"
-. --- still http:-only, 2018-09-07
&'Whoson'& (&url(http://whoson.sourceforge.net)) is a protocol that
allows a server to check whether a particular (dynamically allocated) IP
address is currently allocated to a known (trusted) user and, optionally, to
(again depending on the &%tls_cipher%& log selector).
-.subsection "Requesting and verifying client certificates" SECID183
+.subsection "Requesting and verifying client certificates"
.cindex "certificate" "verification of client"
.cindex "TLS" "client certificate verification"
If you want an Exim server to request a certificate when negotiating a TLS
certificate is supplied, &$tls_in_peerdn$& is empty.
-.section "Revoked certificates" "SECID184"
-.cindex "TLS" "revoked certificates"
-.cindex "revocation list"
-.cindex "certificate" "revocation list"
-.cindex "OCSP" "stapling"
-Certificate issuing authorities issue Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) when
-certificates are revoked. If you have such a list, you can pass it to an Exim
-server using the global option called &%tls_crl%& and to an Exim client using
-an identically named option for the &(smtp)& transport. In each case, the value
-of the option is expanded and must then be the name of a file that contains a
-CRL in PEM format.
-The downside is that clients have to periodically re-download a potentially huge
-file from every certificate authority they know of.
-
-The way with most moving parts at query time is Online Certificate
-Status Protocol (OCSP), where the client verifies the certificate
-against an OCSP server run by the CA. This lets the CA track all
-usage of the certs. It requires running software with access to the
-private key of the CA, to sign the responses to the OCSP queries. OCSP
-is based on HTTP and can be proxied accordingly.
-
-The only widespread OCSP server implementation (known to this writer)
-comes as part of OpenSSL and aborts on an invalid request, such as
-connecting to the port and then disconnecting. This requires
-re-entering the passphrase each time some random client does this.
-
-The third way is OCSP Stapling; in this, the server using a certificate
-issued by the CA periodically requests an OCSP proof of validity from
-the OCSP server, then serves it up inline as part of the TLS
-negotiation. This approach adds no extra round trips, does not let the
-CA track users, scales well with number of certs issued by the CA and is
-resilient to temporary OCSP server failures, as long as the server
-starts retrying to fetch an OCSP proof some time before its current
-proof expires. The downside is that it requires server support.
-
-Unless Exim is built with the support disabled,
-or with GnuTLS earlier than version 3.3.16 / 3.4.8
-support for OCSP stapling is included.
-
-There is a global option called &%tls_ocsp_file%&.
-The file specified therein is expected to be in DER format, and contain
-an OCSP proof. Exim will serve it as part of the TLS handshake. This
-option will be re-expanded for SNI, if the &%tls_certificate%& option
-contains &`tls_in_sni`&, as per other TLS options.
-
-Exim does not at this time implement any support for fetching a new OCSP
-proof. The burden is on the administrator to handle this, outside of
-Exim. The file specified should be replaced atomically, so that the
-contents are always valid. Exim will expand the &%tls_ocsp_file%& option
-on each connection, so a new file will be handled transparently on the
-next connection.
-
-When built with OpenSSL Exim will check for a valid next update timestamp
-in the OCSP proof; if not present, or if the proof has expired, it will be
-ignored.
-
-For the client to be able to verify the stapled OCSP the server must
-also supply, in its stapled information, any intermediate
-certificates for the chain leading to the OCSP proof from the signer
-of the server certificate. There may be zero or one such. These
-intermediate certificates should be added to the server OCSP stapling
-file named by &%tls_ocsp_file%&.
-
-Note that the proof only covers the terminal server certificate,
-not any of the chain from CA to it.
-
-There is no current way to staple a proof for a client certificate.
-
-.code
- A helper script "ocsp_fetch.pl" for fetching a proof from a CA
- OCSP server is supplied. The server URL may be included in the
- server certificate, if the CA is helpful.
-
- One failure mode seen was the OCSP Signer cert expiring before the end
- of validity of the OCSP proof. The checking done by Exim/OpenSSL
- noted this as invalid overall, but the re-fetch script did not.
-.endd
-
-
-.section "Caching of static server configuration items" "SECTserverTLScache"
+.subsection "Caching of static server configuration items" "SSECTserverTLScache"
.cindex certificate caching
.cindex privatekey caching
.cindex crl caching
0.5.10. (Its presence predates the current API which Exim uses, so if Exim
built, then you have SNI support).
+.subsection ALPN
.cindex TLS ALPN
.cindex ALPN "general information"
.cindex TLS "Application Layer Protocol Names"
user certificates, see the &'General implementation overview'& chapter of the
Open-source PKI book, available online at
&url(https://sourceforge.net/projects/ospkibook/).
+
+
+.subsection "Revoked certificates"
+.cindex "TLS" "revoked certificates"
+.cindex "revocation list"
+.cindex "certificate" "revocation list"
+.cindex "OCSP" "stapling"
+There are three ways for a certificate to be made unusable
+before its expiry.
+
+.ilist
+Certificate issuing authorities issue Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) when
+certificates are revoked. If you have such a list, you can pass it to an Exim
+server using the global option called &%tls_crl%& and to an Exim client using
+an identically named option for the &(smtp)& transport. In each case, the value
+of the option is expanded and must then be the name of a file that contains a
+CRL in PEM format.
+The downside is that clients have to periodically re-download a potentially huge
+file from every certificate authority they know of.
+
+.next
+The way with most moving parts at query time is Online Certificate
+Status Protocol (OCSP), where the client verifies the certificate
+against an OCSP server run by the CA. This lets the CA track all
+usage of the certs. It requires running software with access to the
+private key of the CA, to sign the responses to the OCSP queries. OCSP
+is based on HTTP and can be proxied accordingly.
+
+The only widespread OCSP server implementation (known to this writer)
+comes as part of OpenSSL and aborts on an invalid request, such as
+connecting to the port and then disconnecting. This requires
+re-entering the passphrase each time some random client does this.
+
+.next
+The third way is OCSP Stapling; in this, the server using a certificate
+issued by the CA periodically requests an OCSP proof of validity from
+the OCSP server, then serves it up inline as part of the TLS
+negotiation. This approach adds no extra round trips, does not let the
+CA track users, scales well with number of certs issued by the CA and is
+resilient to temporary OCSP server failures, as long as the server
+starts retrying to fetch an OCSP proof some time before its current
+proof expires. The downside is that it requires server support.
+
+Unless Exim is built with the support disabled,
+or with GnuTLS earlier than version 3.3.16 / 3.4.8
+support for OCSP stapling is included.
+
+There is a global option called &%tls_ocsp_file%&.
+The file specified therein is expected to be in DER format, and contain
+an OCSP proof. Exim will serve it as part of the TLS handshake. This
+option will be re-expanded for SNI, if the &%tls_certificate%& option
+contains &`tls_in_sni`&, as per other TLS options.
+
+Exim does not at this time implement any support for fetching a new OCSP
+proof. The burden is on the administrator to handle this, outside of
+Exim. The file specified should be replaced atomically, so that the
+contents are always valid. Exim will expand the &%tls_ocsp_file%& option
+on each connection, so a new file will be handled transparently on the
+next connection.
+
+When built with OpenSSL Exim will check for a valid next update timestamp
+in the OCSP proof; if not present, or if the proof has expired, it will be
+ignored.
+
+For the client to be able to verify the stapled OCSP the server must
+also supply, in its stapled information, any intermediate
+certificates for the chain leading to the OCSP proof from the signer
+of the server certificate. There may be zero or one such. These
+intermediate certificates should be added to the server OCSP stapling
+file named by &%tls_ocsp_file%&.
+
+Note that the proof only covers the terminal server certificate,
+not any of the chain from CA to it.
+
+There is no current way to staple a proof for a client certificate.
+
+.code
+ A helper script "ocsp_fetch.pl" for fetching a proof from a CA
+ OCSP server is supplied. The server URL may be included in the
+ server certificate, if the CA is helpful.
+
+ One failure mode seen was the OCSP Signer cert expiring before the end
+ of validity of the OCSP proof. The checking done by Exim/OpenSSL
+ noted this as invalid overall, but the re-fetch script did not.
+.endd
+.endlist
+
+
.ecindex IIDencsmtp1
.ecindex IIDencsmtp2
for every possible target server. It also scales (slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP
client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also means not having to pay a CA for certificates.
-DANE requires a server operator to do three things: 1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
+DANE requires a server operator to do three things:
+.olist
+Run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
that DNS lookups they do for the server have not been tampered with. The domain MX record applying
to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and any associated CNAME records must all be covered by
DNSSEC.
-2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server certificate for a TLS connection should be.
-3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain, in TLS connections which is is anchored by one of the TLSA records.
+.next
+Add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server certificate for a TLS connection should be.
+.next
+Offer a server certificate, or certificate chain, in TLS connections which is is anchored by one of the TLSA records.
+.endlist
There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side operation of DANE.
Support for client-side operation of DANE can be included at compile time by defining SUPPORT_DANE=yes
in &_Local/Makefile_&.
If it has been included, the macro "_HAVE_DANE" will be defined.
+.subsection "DNS records"
A TLSA record consist of 4 fields, the "Certificate Usage", the
"Selector", the "Matching type", and the "Certificate Association Data".
For a detailed description of the TLSA record see
This means no MD5 and no SHA-1. SHA2-256 is the minimum for reliable
interoperability (and probably the maximum too, in 2018).
+.subsection "Interaction with OCSP"
The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However, this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the
default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff DANE is in use, to:
those who use &%hosts_require_ocsp%&, should consider the interaction with DANE in their OCSP settings.
+.subsection "Client configuration"
For client-side DANE there are three new smtp transport options, &%hosts_try_dane%&, &%hosts_require_dane%&
and &%dane_require_tls_ciphers%&.
The &"require"& variant will result in failure if the target host is not
The router and transport option &%dnssec_request_domains%& must not be
set to &"never"&, and &%dnssec_require_domains%& is ignored.
+.subsection Observability
If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane".
There is a new variable &$tls_out_dane$& which will have "yes" if
The &$event_data$& will be one of the Result Types defined in
Section 4.3 of that document.
+.subsection General
Under GnuTLS, DANE is only supported from version 3.0.0 onwards.
DANE is specified in published RFCs and decouples certificate authority trust
selection from a "race to the bottom" of "you must trust everything for mail
-to get through". There is an alternative technology called MTA-STS, which
+to get through".
+There is an alternative technology called MTA-STS, which
instead publishes MX trust anchor information on an HTTPS website. At the
time this text was last updated, MTA-STS was still a draft, not yet an RFC.
Exim has no support for MTA-STS as a client, but Exim mail server operators
The &%seen%& ACL condition can be used to test whether a
situation has been previously met.
It uses a hints database to record a timestamp against a key.
-host. The syntax of the condition is:
+The syntax of the condition is:
.display
&`seen =`& <&'optional flag'&><&'time interval'&> &`/`& <&'options'&>
.endd
.subsection "Ratelimit options for what is being measured" ratoptmea
.cindex "rate limiting" "per_* options"
-The &%per_conn%& option limits the client's connection rate. It is not
+.vlist
+.vitem per_conn
+.cindex "rate limiting" per_conn
+This option limits the client's connection rate. It is not
normally used in the &%acl_not_smtp%&, &%acl_not_smtp_mime%&, or
&%acl_not_smtp_start%& ACLs.
-The &%per_mail%& option limits the client's rate of sending messages. This is
+.vitem per_mail
+.cindex "rate limiting" per_conn
+This option limits the client's rate of sending messages. This is
the default if none of the &%per_*%& options is specified. It can be used in
&%acl_smtp_mail%&, &%acl_smtp_rcpt%&, &%acl_smtp_predata%&, &%acl_smtp_mime%&,
&%acl_smtp_data%&, or &%acl_not_smtp%&.
-The &%per_byte%& option limits the sender's email bandwidth. It can be used in
+.vitem per_byte
+.cindex "rate limiting" per_conn
+This option limits the sender's email bandwidth. It can be used in
the same ACLs as the &%per_mail%& option, though it is best to use this option
in the &%acl_smtp_mime%&, &%acl_smtp_data%& or &%acl_not_smtp%& ACLs; if it is
used in an earlier ACL, Exim relies on the SIZE parameter given by the client
follow the limit &'m'& in the configuration with K, M, or G to specify limits
in kilobytes, megabytes, or gigabytes, respectively.
-The &%per_rcpt%& option causes Exim to limit the rate at which recipients are
+.vitem per_rcpt
+.cindex "rate limiting" per_rcpt
+This option causes Exim to limit the rate at which recipients are
accepted. It can be used in the &%acl_smtp_rcpt%&, &%acl_smtp_predata%&,
&%acl_smtp_mime%&, or &%acl_smtp_data%& ACLs. In
&%acl_smtp_rcpt%& the rate is updated one recipient at a time; in the other
in either case the rate limiting engine will see a message with many
recipients as a large high-speed burst.
-The &%per_addr%& option is like the &%per_rcpt%& option, except it counts the
+.vitem per_addr
+.cindex "rate limiting" per_addr
+This option is like the &%per_rcpt%& option, except it counts the
number of different recipients that the client has sent messages to in the
last time period. That is, if the client repeatedly sends messages to the same
recipient, its measured rate is not increased. This option can only be used in
&%acl_smtp_rcpt%&.
-The &%per_cmd%& option causes Exim to recompute the rate every time the
+.vitem per_cmd
+.cindex "rate limiting" per_cmd
+This option causes Exim to recompute the rate every time the
condition is processed. This can be used to limit the rate of any SMTP
command. If it is used in multiple ACLs it can limit the aggregate rate of
multiple different commands.
-The &%count=%& option can be used to alter how much Exim adds to the client's
-measured rate. For example, the &%per_byte%& option is equivalent to
-&`per_mail/count=$message_size`&. If there is no &%count=%& option, Exim
+.vitem count
+.cindex "rate limiting" count
+This option can be used to alter how much Exim adds to the client's
+measured rate.
+A value is required, after an equals sign.
+For example, the &%per_byte%& option is equivalent to
+&`per_mail/count=$message_size`&.
+If there is no &%count=%& option, Exim
increases the measured rate by one (except for the &%per_rcpt%& option in ACLs
-other than &%acl_smtp_rcpt%&). The count does not have to be an integer.
+other than &%acl_smtp_rcpt%&).
+The count does not have to be an integer.
-The &%unique=%& option is described in section &<<ratoptuniq>>& below.
+.vitem unique
+.cindex "rate limiting" unique
+This option is described in section &<<ratoptuniq>>& below.
+.endlist
.subsection "Ratelimit update modes" ratoptupd
projects / user / henk / code / exim.git / blobdiff