The udpsend ACL modifier.

[user/henk/code/exim.git] / src / src / tls-openssl.c

diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index 93ee07967d9c26b1d702957b082ad0c696d65a64..6f2646f038aee341c30e92fc4467640743e7dffb 100644 (file)
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL;
 tls_ext_ctx_cb *server_static_cbinfo = NULL;
 
 static int
-setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional, BOOL client);
+setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
+    int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) );
 
 /* Callbacks */
 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
@@ -307,6 +308,9 @@ else
 /*XXX JGH: this looks bogus - we set "verified" first time through, which
 will be for the root CS cert (calls work down the chain).  Why should it
 not be on the last call, where we're setting peerdn?
+
+To test: set up a chain anchored by a good root-CA but with a bad server cert.
+Does certificate_verified get set?
 */
 if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
 *calledp = TRUE;
@@ -739,7 +743,7 @@ if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
   }
 #endif
 
-rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, FALSE);
+rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, verify_callback_server);
 if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 
 /* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
@@ -1191,13 +1195,14 @@ Arguments:
   host          NULL in a server; the remote host in a client
   optional      TRUE if called from a server for a host in tls_try_verify_hosts;
                 otherwise passed as FALSE
-  client        TRUE if called for client startup, FALSE for server startup
+  cert_vfy_cb  Callback function for certificate verification
 
 Returns:        OK/DEFER/FAIL
 */
 
 static int
-setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional, BOOL client)
+setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
+    int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) )
 {
 uschar *expcerts, *expcrl;
 
@@ -1296,7 +1301,7 @@ if (expcerts != NULL && *expcerts != '\0')
 
   SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx,
     SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
-    client ? verify_callback_client : verify_callback_server);
+    cert_vfy_cb);
   }
 
 return OK;
@@ -1375,13 +1380,15 @@ server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
 
 if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
   {
-  rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, FALSE);
+  rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
+                       FALSE, verify_callback_server);
   if (rc != OK) return rc;
   server_verify_optional = FALSE;
   }
 else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
   {
-  rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, TRUE, FALSE);
+  rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
+                       TRUE, verify_callback_server);
   if (rc != OK) return rc;
   server_verify_optional = TRUE;
   }
@@ -1549,7 +1556,7 @@ if (expciphers != NULL)
     return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL);
   }
 
-rc = setup_certs(client_ctx, verify_certs, crl, host, FALSE, TRUE);
+rc = setup_certs(client_ctx, verify_certs, crl, host, FALSE, verify_callback_client);
 if (rc != OK) return rc;
 
 if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL);
@@ -1963,12 +1970,26 @@ vaguely_random_number(int max)
 {
 unsigned int r;
 int i, needed_len;
+static pid_t pidlast = 0;
+pid_t pidnow;
 uschar *p;
 uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
 
 if (max <= 1)
   return 0;
 
+pidnow = getpid();
+if (pidnow != pidlast)
+  {
+  /* Although OpenSSL documents that "OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state
+  is unique for each thread", this doesn't apparently apply across processes,
+  so our own warning from vaguely_random_number_fallback() applies here too.
+  Fix per PostgreSQL. */
+  if (pidlast != 0)
+    RAND_cleanup();
+  pidlast = pidnow;
+  }
+
 /* OpenSSL auto-seeds from /dev/random, etc, but this a double-check. */
 if (!RAND_status())
   {