X-Git-Url: https://git.netwichtig.de/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fsrc%2Ftls-openssl.c;h=8f4cf4d82fbd937502918de05501b883fbd866c3;hb=c8b2f3749e953b254b4d6ac1ea047451eb771953;hp=982a5ba7e267a0ef9baea8dd7fda25b82f1b4764;hpb=48224640cb97b694c3ea2f159c3e60d64598ba65;p=user%2Fhenk%2Fcode%2Fexim.git diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c index 982a5ba7e..8f4cf4d82 100644 --- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c +++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c @@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ functions from the OpenSSL library. */ # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_DH_BITS # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD +# else +# define EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT # endif # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010000000L \ && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0x0000ff000L) >= 0x000002000L @@ -368,7 +370,9 @@ if (!msg) msg = US ssl_errstring; } -if (errstr) *errstr = string_sprintf("(%s): %s", prefix, msg); +msg = string_sprintf("(%s): %s", prefix, msg); +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS error '%s'\n", msg); +if (errstr) *errstr = msg; return host ? FAIL : DEFER; } @@ -1172,7 +1176,7 @@ if (!(x509 = X509_new())) goto err; where = US"generating pkey"; -if (!(rsa = rsa_callback(NULL, 0, 1024))) +if (!(rsa = rsa_callback(NULL, 0, 2048))) goto err; where = US"assigning pkey"; @@ -1300,8 +1304,8 @@ else if ((err = tls_add_certfile(sctx, cbinfo, expanded, errstr))) return err; - if (cbinfo->privatekey != NULL && - !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded, errstr)) + if ( cbinfo->privatekey + && !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded, errstr)) return DEFER; /* If expansion was forced to fail, key_expanded will be NULL. If the result @@ -1404,7 +1408,7 @@ if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()))) { ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring)); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring); - return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + goto bad; } /* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object @@ -1420,11 +1424,11 @@ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, cbinfo); if ( !init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL, &dummy_errstr) || !init_ecdh(server_sni, NULL, &dummy_errstr) ) - return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + goto bad; if ( cbinfo->server_cipher_list && !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list)) - return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + goto bad; #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file) @@ -1436,17 +1440,18 @@ if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file) if ((rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, verify_callback_server, &dummy_errstr)) != OK) - return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + goto bad; /* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying OCSP information. */ if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo, &dummy_errstr)) != OK) - return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + goto bad; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n"); SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, server_sni); - return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + +bad: return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } #endif /* EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT */ @@ -1714,8 +1719,10 @@ cbinfo->host = host; cbinfo->event_action = NULL; #endif +#ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); +#endif #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SHA256 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the @@ -2120,7 +2127,7 @@ if (expcerts && *expcerts) /* If verification is optional, don't fail if no certificate */ SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx, - SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT), + SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional ? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT), cert_vfy_cb); } @@ -2274,6 +2281,8 @@ if (rc <= 0) } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_accept was successful\n"); +ERR_clear_error(); /* Even success can leave errors in the stack. Seen with + anon-authentication ciphersuite negociated. */ /* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS, and initialize things. */ @@ -2909,10 +2918,22 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, %lu%s)\n", __FUNCTION__, "more" is notified. This hack is only ok if small amounts are involved AND only one stream does it, in one context (i.e. no store reset). Currently it is used for the responses to the received SMTP MAIL , RCPT, DATA sequence, only. */ +/*XXX + if PIPE_COMMAND, banner & ehlo-resp for smmtp-on-connect. Suspect there's +a store reset there. */ if (!ct_ctx && (more || corked)) { +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT + int save_pool = store_pool; + store_pool = POOL_PERM; +#endif + corked = string_catn(corked, buff, len); + +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT + store_pool = save_pool; +#endif + if (more) return len; buff = CUS corked->s; @@ -3044,8 +3065,10 @@ uschar *s, *expciphers, *err; /* this duplicates from tls_init(), we need a better "init just global state, for no specific purpose" singleton function of our own */ +#ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT SSL_load_error_strings(); OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); +#endif #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the list of available digests. */