The historical behaviour can be restored by disabling (a new) log_selector
"queue_time_exclusive".
+JH/51 Taint-check ACL line. Previously, only filenames (for out-of-line ACL
+ content) were specifically tested for. Now, also cover epxansions
+ rerulting in acl names and inline ACL content.
+
Exim version 4.94
acl_text = ss;
+#ifdef notyet_taintwarn
+if ( !f.running_in_test_harness
+ && is_tainted2(acl_text, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+ "attempt to use tainted ACL text \"%s\"", acl_text))
+ {
+ /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
+ *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+#else
+if (is_tainted(acl_text) && !f.running_in_test_harness)
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+ "attempt to use tainted ACL text \"%s\"", acl_text);
+ /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
+ *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+#endi
+
/* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
else if (*ss == '/')
{
struct stat statbuf;
- if (is_tainted(ss))
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
- "attempt to open tainted ACL file name \"%s\"", ss);
- /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
- *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
- return ERROR;
- }
if ((fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,